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Abstract 
This paper investigates how farmers’ risk attitudes affected the adoption of agricultural 
technology in a rural area in Cambodia. We incorporated prospect theory to farmers’ utility function 
and examined the effect of the risk attitude of farmers to the adoption of two technologies: adoption 
of a moisture meter for measuring the moisture content of seeds, a recently introduced post-harvest 
technology, and a modern rice variety that was introduced in the 1990s. The results indicated that 
farmers overweighted a small probability and risk averse farmers adopted a moisture meter to 
measure the moisture contents of seeds significantly. With respect to the modern rice variety, 
farmers’ risk attitude did not affect the adoption. Our results and the results of a previous study 
imply that the type of risk and uncertainty faced by farmers at the time of decision-making of its 
adoption partly determine the effect of risk attitude on agricultural adoption. 
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1. Introduction  
One of the important roles of agricultural extension services and international aid 
agencies in rural development is to make more efficient production technologies available to local 
farmers through diffusion and adoption assistance. Despite the advantages of the newer technologies, 
some farmers do not adopt these technologies. This is true even when the output (e.g. yield) tends to 
be better compared with the output achieved by traditional technologies. Why do some farmers not 
adopt new technology?   
 
Previous studies have attempted to explain this phenomenon by credit constraints 
(Croppenstedt et al., 2003; Karlan et al., 2012), learning effects (Besely and Case, 1993; Conley and 
Udry, 2010; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Munshi, 2004), accessibility of weather forecasting 
(Rosenzweig and Udry, 2013), lack of insurance markets and capital markets (Karlan et al., 2012) 
and heterogeneity in the cost and benefit of technologies (Suri, 2011). More recent studies have 
attempted to answer the question through the position of behavioral economics. Duflo et al. (2011) 
revealed that naïve farmers are unlikely to adopt fertilizers in Kenya because they cannot solve the 
problem of self-commitment. Since external factors (e.g. weather, pest damage) influence the output 
of agricultural production, agricultural production entails production risk. Farmers’ risk attitude is an 
important determinant in the decision-making of technology adoption in the theoretical model (Feder, 
sdeterminant of technological adoption (Koundouri et al., 2006; Liu, 2013; Liu and Huang, 2013). 
However, the literature on how the risk attitude of farmers affects technological adoption is 
insufficient.  
 
We aimed to fill the gap in the empirical evidence in the literature by analyzing the effect 
of farmers’ risk attitude on decision-making regarding the adoption of different technologies. We 
focused on two types of technologies. The first is a new technology entailing high risk and 
uncertainty in its function at the initial stage of introduction (Technology A in Fig. [1]). For example, 
a new seed variety is categorized in Technology A. While external factors (e.g. weather, soil 
conditions) determine its yield, farmers do not know the exact distribution of outcome in their own 
farming land at the time of its introduction due to a lack of experience of agricultural production 
using the new seed variety. Owing to the process of learning from their own experience and that of 
other farmers, the risk and uncertainty decreases over time (Technology A’ in Fig. [1]). The second 
is a new technology involving low risk and uncertainty in its function at the time of introduction 
(Technology B in Fig. [1]) since external factors do not affect its function. Because of limited data, 
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we analyzed the effect of farmers’ risk attitude on the adoption of Technology A’ and Technology B. 
Thus, we refer to the result of Liu (2013), which reveals how risk attitude affects the timing of 
adoption of a technology such as Technology A in Fig. [1], using data on cotton farmers in China.    
 
 Why do we need to analyze the effect of farmers’ risk attitude on the decision to adopt 
different technologies? There are two answers. One is that several technologies entail different types 
of uncertainty and risk. Thus, the effect of farmers’ risk attitude might vary across technologies and 
the timing of their introduction. For example, in the case of a new rice variety, both exogenous 
factors such as the weather and the characteristics of the farming land (e.g. irrigation system and soil 
quality) determine its yield. In addition, owing to lack of experience of agricultural production using 
the new rice variety, farmers cannot accurately predict the yield (how the new rice variety seeds 
grow on their own farming land) at the time of its introduction. In other words, farmers face 
exogenous risk and uncertainty such as the weather as well as risk and uncertainty in the variety’s 
yield. Farmers learn to predict the yield from their own experience as well as that of other farmers. 
Risk and uncertainty in the function of a new technology decrease over time. In contrast with such a 
new variety seed, measuring machines (e.g. thermometer, moisture meter) are technologies whose 
function is not affected by external factors and circumstances. Farmers know the exact function of 
the technology before they decide whether to adopt it. Since types of risk and uncertainty faced by 
farmers at the time of decision-making on technological adoption vary across different technologies 
and the timing of their introduction, the effect of farmers’ risk attitude may also vary across different 
technologies and their timing of introduction.  
 
Second, farmers’ risk attitude correlates with other farmers’ characteristics. For example, 
Tanaka et al. (2010) showed that risk attitude correlated with educational level and age in a rural 
area in Vietnam. The evidence indicates that we cannot separately identify the effects of other 
variables from the effect of preferences without controlling these preferences in estimated equations.  
  
Our study is based on a survey of rice farmers conducted in Cambodia. The International 
Rice Research Institution (IRRI) has implemented this survey aimed at improving living standards in 
rural areas in Cambodia since 2005. We conducted a survey of the rice farmers in 20 villages in four 
provinces (Battambang, Prey Veng, Pursat, and Takeo) from December 2012 to January 2013 as a 
part of an assessment of the post-harvest technologies interventions of IRRI. Thus, we collected 
information of usage conditions of technologies that IRRI provided lately as well as that on rice 
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farming activities during the past one year.  
 
 In this study, we considered two types of technologies: moisture meter and a modern 
variety of rice seed. A moisture meter is a post-harvest technology recently introduced by IRRI and 
corresponds to Technology B in Fig. [1]. The moisture meter allows farmers to know the moisture 
content of rice accurately. External factors (e.g. weather, humidity) do not affect its function. The 
moisture content of seeds affects their germination rate (IRRI, 2008). Before its introduction, 
farmers measured the moisture content by themselves. They checked the moisture content by biting 
the seeds or feeling by hand. However, with these manual methods, risk and uncertainty exist 
because the farmers might measure the moisture content inaccurately. The moisture meter resolves 
the risk and uncertainty regarding the moisture contents of seeds. Modern varieties of rice seeds 
(compared to traditional varieties) were introduced in Cambodia in the 1990s. The modern variety of 
rice seed has a higher tolerance compared to the traditional variety of seed. Farmers can sow the 
modern variety of seed in all three agricultural seasons (dry, early wet and wet seasons). Since 
agricultural production is affected by external factors (e.g. weather, soil quality) and farmers cannot 
predict its yield at the time of its introduction, the modern variety of seed entails risk and uncertainty 
for farmers at the time of its introduction. Owing to the process of learning from their own 
experience and that of other farmers, risk and uncertainty regarding its yield are reduced over time. 
Thus, the modern variety of rice seed corresponds to Technology A’ in Fig. [1]. 
 
We incorporated prospect theory (PT) into the utility function of farmers. In the utility 
function, risk aversion (concavity of agents’ value function), loss aversion (degree of agents’ 
sensitivity to loss compared to gain) and nonlinear probability weighting (how an agent 
overestimates a small (large) probability and underestimates a large (small) probability) determine 
the shape of the utility function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The utility function, thus, is distinct 
from the expected utility (EU), which parameterizes the risk aversion of the utility function as risk 
attitude. Why do we need to incorporate PT into the utility function of farmers? One possible answer 
is that the degree of risk aversion alone is not sufficient to express the effect of risk attitude on 
technological adoption since agricultural activities entail several types of risk and uncertainty. In 
addition, farmers implicitly set a target income1 for earning subsistence income under the risk and 
uncertainty. In fact, Liu (2013) showed that loss aversion, nonlinear probability weighing and risk 
aversion affected the timing of adoption of a new cotton variety seed (Bacillus thuringiensis cotton: 
BT cotton, which has the same quality as the traditional cotton variety and controls pest damage 
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without the use of pesticides).  
 
Following the method of Tanaka et al. (2010), we asked virtual questions regarding the 
preference of lotteries to elicit the farmers’ risk preferences in the interviews. Applying this method, 
we estimated three components of utility function: risk aversion, loss aversion and nonlinear 
probability weighting. Since Liu (2013) also applied this method, we could compare the effect of 
farmers’ risk preferences across technologies.  
 
As expected, the effects of risk preferences on technological adoption varied across these 
technologies. Risk averse farmers and farmers who overestimate a small probability used the 
moisture meter for measuring the moisture contents of seeds. However, with respect to the modern 
variety, there was no effect of farmers’ risk preferences. Rather, the choice of variety was largely 
determined by other household characteristics and type of irrigation. Our results imply the types of 
risk and uncertainty faced by farmers at the time of decision-making on technological adoption 
partly influence the outcomes of risk preferences.   
 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews in detail the agricultural 
technologies on which we focused. Section 3 explains the survey design and the experiment in the 
study. Section 4 presents econometric analysis using household level data. Section 5 discusses our 
results and compares them with the results of previous studies. The last section provides 
conclusions. 
 
 
2. Background  
2.1 Moisture Meter  
 IRRI has provided post-harvest technologies2 for improving farmer’s living standards in 
rural areas in Cambodia. In Battambang and Prey Veng, the first (or old) moisture meters were 
provided in February 2008. These moisture meters were made by IRRI (low cost, unreliable and did 
not last long). New moisture meters were introduced to these two villages in January 2012 and the 
same type of moisture meter was simultaneously introduced to two other provinces: Pursat and 
Takeo. This newer moisture meter is digital and is made in Japan or South Korea (accurate but 
relatively expensive). Therefore, the timing of introduction of the technology varied across 
provinces. One set of moisture meters was distributed to two representatives of farmers in each 
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treatment village and one of the representative farmers kept the moisture meter in each village. They 
were required to set up an inception meeting to teach farmers how to use the post-harvest 
technologies, and to lend each item to farmers if required. 
 
Fig. [2] shows a photo of the moisture meter provided by IRRI in January 2012. Farmers 
can measure the accurate moisture content of rice easily by using the moisture meter. Owing to the 
simplicity of its function and the explanation given at the inception meeting, farmers could learn 
how to use it easily. Moisture is one of the most important indicators for checking whether the seeds 
are being appropriately managed; the germination rate of seeds greatly depends on the moisture 
content (IRRI, 2008). In fact, 42.7% of farmers used a moisture meter to measure the moisture 
content of seeds in our sample (Table [1]). Since farmers measured the moisture content by biting or 
by hand before its introduction, risk and uncertainty existed in measuring the moisture content. The 
moisture meter contributed to reducing the risk and uncertainty. 
 
2.2 Modern Variety of Rice 
Broadly speaking, there are two varieties of rice seed: the traditional variety of seed 
(hereafter TV) and the modern variety of seed (hereafter MV). TV is an indigenous variety of seed 
that farmers have used for a long time. MV is a hybrid variety of seed introduced in the 1990s (FAO, 
2002). The function of MV differs from that of TV. In particular, owing to the difference of 
tolerance between MV and TV, farmers can plant MV in a rainless season with appropriate water 
management. In Cambodia, there are three farming seasons: dry season, early wet season and wet 
season. While farmers can grow MV in all seasons, farmers can grow TV in only the wet season 
each year. According to our data collected in four provinces in Cambodia, few farmers planted TV 
in the dry and early wet season (Table [2]).  
 
In the wet season in 2012, approximately 90% of plots in our sample were planted with 
TV3. The selling price of TV is higher than that of MV. For this reason, many farmers might plant 
TV. Also, the planting period of MV is shorter than TV and MV is more tolerant to adverse weather 
conditions than TV.  
 
Since external factors (e.g. weather, soil quality) affect the yield of rice production and 
farmers do not understand its function at the time of its introduction, risk and uncertainty in its 
function are expected at the time of its introduction. However, over the long term (about 20 years), 
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the risk and uncertainty have reduced owing to the process of learning from their own experience 
and that of other farmers. 
 
 
3. Data 
3.1 IRRI Survey  
We carried out a farmers’ survey in 20 villages in four provinces (Battambang, Prey 
Veng, Pursat, and Takeo) to assess the post-harvest technologies interventions IRRI implemented for 
improving living standards in rural areas in Cambodia. The survey was conducted from December 
2012 to January 2013. This period corresponded to the period after the wet season when almost all 
farmers in Cambodia are engaged in rice farming. We collected a variety of information: usage 
conditions of post-harvest technologies, agricultural activities during the past year, social and 
demographic characteristics, respondent preferences, and non-agricultural income sources.  
 
In the survey, we invited farmers selected randomly in each village to a public place of 
the village and allocated an enumerator to each farmer. In the interview, each enumerator started the 
interview at a distance from other enumerators to avoid the influence of another farmer’s answer. 
Since we focused on the risk preferences of individuals who were involved in decision-making on 
agricultural adoption, we requested that the selected farmers should be the household head or the 
head’s wife. The enumerators basically asked the respondents each question orally to avoid 
misunderstanding. The respondents received a gift at the end of the interview.  
  
We did not collect information on rice production from the representatives of each 
village. Instead, we interviewed the representatives and obtained information about the village in 
detail (e.g. experience of natural disasters).  
 
There were two types of villages: treatment villages and control villages. While the 
former villages received the post-harvest technological equipment from IRRI, the latter villages did 
not. We collected the same information on input and output for rice-farming activities in both the 
treatment village and the control village. On the other hand, information on the usage of the 
post-harvest technology was collected at the treatment villages only. Thus, while we could use data 
of both groups in the analysis of rice variety choice, we restricted the data to that collected in the 
treatment villages in the analysis of adoption of a moisture meter4.   
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While not all farmers were engaged in rice farming during the dry season and the early 
wet season, almost all of the farmers planted rice in the wet season. Farmers can choose whether to 
plant TV or MV in the wet season. Thus, we focused on rice farming in the wet season. 
 
Although we surveyed 349 households, 19 households could not be used because the 
respondents were not a head of household or the head’s wife. In addition, because of missing data 
and outliers, only 238 samples were used. Table [3] shows descriptive statistics of the sample. The 
first three preference parameters are explained later in the subsection on how to measure risk 
preferences. The average age of the head was 48.5 years old. A household head had finished 
approximately 5 years of education on average. 78.2% of the household heads were male. The 
average maximum years of schooling was 9.2 years, which is approximately two times the average 
years of schooling of the household head. This seems to reflect the recent growth in the number of 
years of schooling of young people owing to the introduction of free education after the collapse of 
the Pol Pot regime. Approximately 16% of heads gained their income from non-agricultural work 
and the average total non-agricultural income in households in the past year was 4.4 million riel 5. 
The average total earnings from rice farming in the dry and early wet season was 0.9 million riel. 
The average total amount of rice in storage for selling in the dry and the early wet seasons and the 
average total amount for self-consumption in the dry and the early wet seasons were 114.3 kg and 
347.3 kg, respectively. Farmers who were engaged in rice farming in the dry or the early wet season 
kept a larger amount of rice for self-consumption than for selling. With respect to the usage of a 
moisture meter, 42.7% of farmers adopted it to measure the moisture content of seeds in the wet 
season. On average, the usage rate of the moisture meter by the other farmers in the same village in 
the wet season in 2012 was around 37.8%6.    
 
Since the characteristics of the plot might affect farmers’ crop choice, we used a sample plot 
for analysis of crop choice to control for plot characteristics. The survey collected detailed 
information on the plots such as area, type of soil, source of irrigation and elevation. Table [4] 
displays descriptive statistics of the plots. The average area of a plot was 0.8 hectare. Regarding the 
type of soil, 77.8% of plots were loam, 21.5% of plots were clay, 2.5% of plots were sandy, and 
2.5% of plots were other. 82.8% of plots were located at a middle elevation, 6.6% of plots were 
located at a high elevation and 10.6% of plots were located at a low elevation. No irrigation system 
was installed on 70.7% of plots. Few plots had irrigation systems (deep wall pumps/shallow tube 
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wells/pumped from rivers, canals, dams).  
 
3.2 How to Measure Risk Preferences 
To elicit farmers’ risk preferences, we asked hypothetical questions regarding 
preferences at the beginning of each interview. Following the experiment of Tanaka et al. (2010), we 
examined the attitude of respondents by using a pair-wise lottery of both risky and safer alternatives 
as shown in Table [5]. For example, a farmer faces the following choice at row 1 in series 1: in 
Lottery A which is a safer choice than B, the respondent can receive 40,000 riel with a probability of 
70% and the respondent can receive 10,000 riel with a probability of 30%: in Lottery B, which is a 
riskier choice than A, the respondent can receive 68,000 riel with a probability of 10% and the 
respondent can receive 5,000 riel with a probability of 90%. Although both the probability of 
winning and the amount of winning in Lottery A do not change, only the amount of winning in 
Lottery B increases with the number of rows. However, in series 3, both the probability and the 
amount of winning change in Lottery A and Lottery B.  
 
We requested the enumerators to ask each respondent to choose either Lottery A or 
Lottery B for each row until the respondent switched from Lottery A to Lottery B in each series. For 
example, if the respondent shifted from Lottery A to Lottery B at row 6 in series 1, the enumerator 
started to ask series 2. 
 
In this study, we assumed farmers have the following utility function. This utility 
function was proposed by Tanaka et al. (2010).  
 
𝑈 𝑥, 𝑝; 𝑦, 𝑞 = 𝑣 𝑦 + 𝜋 𝑝 𝑣 𝑥 − 𝑣 𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑥𝑦 > 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝑥 > 𝑦𝑣 𝑦 + 𝜋 𝑝 𝑣 𝑥 + 𝜋 𝑞 𝑣 𝑦   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                (1) 
 
where p and q are the probability of outcomes x and y, respectively; the value function is defined as 𝑣 𝑧 = 𝑧! for 𝑧 > 0 , 𝑣 𝑧 = 𝜆𝑧! for 𝑧<0, where 𝑧 = 𝑥, 𝑦 ; the probability weighting function 
is given by 𝜋 𝑝 = 1/exp  [ln  (1/p)]! .  Parameters 𝜎 and  𝜆  are the measure of risk-aversion and 
the measure of loss aversion. A lower 𝜎 means a more risk-averse individual. If 𝜆 > 1, the 
individual feels more sensitive to a loss. If 𝛼 < 1, the weighting function is inverse S-shaped, which 
means that the individual esteems a small probability and devalues a high probability. If 𝛼 > 1, the 
weighing function is S-shaped, which means that the individual devalues a small probability and 
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esteems a high probability. In the case of 𝜆 = 1 and 𝛼   = 1, the utility function equals the standard 
expected utility function. We computed three parameters 𝜆,𝜎 and 𝛼 using the switching points of 
respondents in the three series in Table [5]. Following the previous studies, we did not use the 
sample of respondents who did not switch from Lottery A to Lottery B. Descriptive statistics of 
these parameters are listed in Table [3]. We tested the null hypothesis that 𝜆 = 1 and 𝛼 = 1 using 
the computed parameters of each of the farmers, and rejected the hypothesis at the 1% significance 
level.   
 
 
4. Econometric frameworks and regression results 
4.1  Use of the Moisture Meter for Seeds 
First, we considered the decision-making on adoption of a moisture meter to measure the 
moisture content of seeds. Since almost all the farmers were engaged in rice farming in the wet 
season, we focused on the adoption of a moisture meter in the wet season. As explained in Section 
2.1, the use of a moisture meter reduces the risk and uncertainty in measuring the moisture contents 
of seeds. When farmers borrow a moisture meter from the representative in each village, the farmers 
must bear any cost of borrowing (e.g. contact, transplantation). How farmers evaluate the occasion 
of measuring the moisture contents inaccurately will determine the effects of farmers’ risk 
preference on its adoption. Our hypothesis is that farmers who fear the occasion, farmers who 
overestimate the occasion and farmers who care about the loss of mismeasuring the moisture 
contents (e.g. low germinant rate) tend to adopt the moisture meter.  
 
To test the hypothesis, we first estimated the following model by applying a linear 
probability model, 
 Moisture!"∗ = 𝛿! + 𝛿!𝜎!" + 𝛿!𝜆!" + 𝛿!𝛼!" + 𝜇! + 𝜀!"                (2)  
 
where i denotes farmer, and v denotes village; 𝑀𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒!"∗  takes 1 if farmer i in village v uses the 
moisture meter in the wet season and takes 0 if farmer i in village v does not use the moisture meter. 𝜎!" is the degree of risk aversion of farmer i in village v and 𝜆!" is the degree of loss aversion of 
farmer i in village v. 𝛼!" is the degree of probability weighting of farmer i in village v and 𝜇! is a 
province fixed effect. 𝜀!" is the unobservable error term. If our hypothesis is correct, the signs of 𝛿! and 𝛿! will be negative and the sign of 𝛿! will be positive. 
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We did not control for the village fixed effects in Eq.(2) since unobservable 
characteristics (e.g. weather, quality of soil) are unlikely to affect whether farmers used the moisture 
meter for seeds. However, as mentioned above, the timing of introduction of post-harvest 
technologies differed across provinces. To control for the effect, we added province fixed effects in 
the equation.  
 
The results of the estimation using Eq.(2) are presented in Column(1) in Table [6]. The 
coefficients of province fixed effect are not shown in the table due to space limitations. As expected, 
a farmer who esteems a small probability and who is more risk averse is more likely to use the 
moisture meter for seeds, and these are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. However, the 
parameter of loss aversion does not affect the adoption significantly. The results imply that risk 
averse farmers who fear measuring the moisture content accurately and farmers who overweight the 
probability of measuring the moisture contents inaccurately adopted the moisture meter. Thus, how 
farmers worry about measuring the moisture content of seed inappropriately is closely related to the 
adoption of the moisture meter for seeds. 
 
However, other factors might affect not only the use of the moisture meter, but also 
farmers’ risk preferences. In that case, we cannot distinguish the effect of risk preferences from the 
effect of other factors. Tanaka et al. (2010) showed that the degree of risk aversion was negatively 
correlated with educational level in a rural area in Vietnam. Then, if educational level were 
correlated with the adoption of the moisture meter, parameters of risk preferences would be biased. 
In addition, other farmers’ decisions regarding the adoption of the moisture meter would affect the 
decision-making. To control for these effects, we considered the following linear probability model.  
 𝑀𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒!"∗ = 𝛿! + 𝛿!𝜎!" + 𝛿!𝜆!" + 𝛿!𝛼!" + 𝜉𝑋!" + 𝜇! + 𝑢!"                (3)  
 
where 𝑋!" is a vector of the characteristics of farmer i in village v; such as the characteristics of the 
head (age, education, sex), maximum education in household, earning from non-agricultural work, 
and moisture meter usage rate of other farmers in village v; 𝑢!" is the unobservable error term.  
 
The moisture meter usage rate of other farmers allows us to control for not only the effect 
of accessibility to a moisture meter in each village but also the effect of the externality from other 
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farmers. As explained by Besely and Case (1993), we cannot identify the effect of the externality 
from other farmers accurately by using cross sectional data since its estimator is influenced by the 
effects of both accessibility and externality at the same time.  
 
Column (2) shows the results of estimation by Eq.(3). The effect of risk preferences is 
consistent with the results of estimation by Eq.(2). Educated heads are more likely to use the 
moisture meter to measure the moisture content of seeds, and the coefficient of this variable is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Farmers who earn more non-agricultural income are 
less likely to use the moisture meter for seeds and that is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level. We found that the amount of rice saved for seed does not affect the decision of whether to use 
the moisture meter. This implies that the amount of seed is not an important factor in determining 
the use of the moisture meter. The coefficient of the moisture meter usage rate of other farmers is 
positive, implying the presence of externality or learning from others, but it is not statistically 
significant.  
 
4.2  Variety Choice  
Secondly, we focused on the decision concerning the choice of rice variety. Since almost 
all of the farmers are engaged in rice farming in the wet season, we also focused on the decision 
regarding the choice of rice variety in the wet season. The risk and uncertainty in the function of MV 
is expected to be low. We assumed that farmers know the function and profitability of each variety 
in their plots. However, farmers might face exogenous risk (e.g. drought) and uncertainty in rice 
production. Thus, how farmers evaluate the occasion of exogenous risk (e.g. drought) will determine 
the effects of farmers’ risk preference in deciding which variety of rice to choose. Our hypothesis is 
that farmers who fear drought, and who overestimate the possibility of drought, and who care about 
the loss caused by drought would tend to adopt MV, which has higher tolerance compared to TV. 
 
To test this hypothesis, we estimated the following model by applying the linear 
probability model, 
 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑛  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦!"#∗ = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝜎!" + 𝛽!𝜆!" + 𝛽!𝛼!" + 𝛾𝑋!" + 𝜇! + 𝜀!"#                (4)  
 
where i denotes farmer, j denotes plot, and v denotes village;  𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑛  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦!"#∗  takes 1 if farmer i 
in village v adopts MV in plot j in the wet season, and takes 0 if farmer i in village v adopts TV in 
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plot j in the wet season otherwise.   𝜎!" is the degree of risk aversion of farmer i in village v and 𝜆!" 
is the degree of loss aversion of farmer i in village v. 𝛼!" is the degree of probability weighting of 
farmer i in village v and 𝑋!" is a vector of the characteristics of farmer i in village v, such as the 
characteristics of the head (e.g. age, education, sex), maximum education in household member of 
household i, whether the head earns from non-agricultural income, total earning from 
non-agricultural work, whether farmer i borrowed money for rice farming during the past year and 
earning/harvesting from rice farming in dry/early wet season. 𝜇! captures the village fixed effects 
and 𝜀!"# is the unobservable error term. If our hypothesis is correct, the signs of 𝛽! and 𝛽! should 
be negative and the sign of 𝛽! should be positive.  
 
Previous studies have shown a significant effect of the externality from other farmers on 
the adoption of a new technology (Conley and Udry, 2010; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Munshi, 
2004). However, this is not necessarily the case for the choice of rice crop in Cambodia. Cambodian 
farmers may have sufficient knowledge about the crop varieties because they have been growing 
them for a long time in Cambodia.  
 
Another possible channel would be that farmers are likely to choose the same crop 
variety as other farmers. For example, the agricultural union in each village encourages farmers to 
use MV. According to our interviews of village leaders in selected villages, however, the agricultural 
unions may not be functioning effectively in Cambodia for historical reasons7. Thus, the influence of 
unions may be limited.  
 
The weather is thought to influence the choices. According to our interview with the 
village leaders in the selected villages, several farmers switched from TV to MV after an incidence 
of drought. In our estimation, we tried to control the effects of natural disaster by adding village 
fixed effects.  
 
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the selling price of TV is higher than that of MV. Thus, 
farmers planning to sell their harvest may prefer to plant TV. While we cannot test the effect of the 
selling price on the rice variety choice in our analysis, the village fixed effects allow us to control the 
effect of the selling price8.  
 
Column (1) in Table [7] shows the results of estimation by Eq.(3). Due to space 
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limitations, we omitted the coefficients of the village fixed effect from the table. Except for the 
estimator of loss aversion, the signs of risk preferences are consistent with our hypothesis. The signs 
of the estimated parameter imply that farmers who worry about drought, farmers who overweight the 
incidence of drought tend to use MV and loss averse farmers tend to adopt TV. However, our 
hypothesis is not supported statistically. In other words, the decision-making on crop choice is not 
determined by farmers’ risk preferences. Male heads are more likely to adopt MV than female heads. 
While total earnings from rice farming in the dry season and the early wet season are significantly 
negatively correlated with the probability of adoption of MV, the total amount of rice stored for self 
consumption in the dry and the early wet seasons significantly increases the probability. It implies 
that farmers change their choice of variety based on the harvest in the previous seasons. 
   
In our sample, some farmers plant different varieties in different plots. This implies that 
farmers flexibly adjust to the characteristics of their plot (e.g. quality of soil, the irrigation system 
and elevation). To control these possibilities, we modified Eq.(4) as follows:  
 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑛  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦!"#∗   = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝜎!" + 𝛽!𝜆!" + 𝛽!𝛼!" + 𝛾𝑋!" +   𝛿𝑍!"# + 𝜇! + 𝑢!"#          (5) 
 
where 𝑍!"# is a vector of characteristics of a plot. 𝑢!"# is the unobservable error term. The results 
of estimation by Eq.(5) are shown in column (2) in Table [7]. We omit the coefficients of the village 
fixed effects from the table due to space limitations.  
 
The sign of estimator of loss aversion switches from negative to positive in Eq.(5). This 
is consistent with our hypothesis. The sign implies that loss averse farmers tend to use MV. 
However, no estimated parameters of risk preferences significantly affect the probability in Eq.(5) 
along with the result of the estimation of Eq.(4). Thus, our hypothesis is also rejected. By 
considering the plot characteristics in the analysis, the effects of some variables became significant. 
Farmers who earn more income from non-agricultural work are more likely to adopt TV, and the 
coefficient of this variable is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Among the 
characteristics of plot, the crop choice decision is not affected by soil quality and elevation. In 
contrast, farmers choose MV significantly in the plots that have access to water for agriculture 
pumped from rivers/canals/dams.  
 
Robustness check  
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As mentioned above, some farmers adopted both MV and TV in their plots. In those who 
adopted both MV and TV, some farmers dispersed the yield risk (e.g. drought) by adopting multiple 
varieties. However, this means we cannot identify the effect of farmers’ risk preference on the 
adoption of MV from the effect of farmers’ risk preference on risk diversification through crop 
diversification. To remove the latter effect, we ignored samples of farmers who adopted both MV 
and TV in their plot, and used Eq.(5) to re-estimate. We show the results of estimation in column (3) 
in Table [7]. The results have not changed dramatically although some control variables such as the 
characteristics of farmers became insignificant. This confirms that our main arguments still hold.  
 
 
5. Discussion 
Our results contrast with those of Liu (2013). Liu (2013) focused on the relationship 
between the farmers’ risk preferences and the timing of adoption of Bacillus thuringiensis (BT) 
cotton in a rural area in China. BT cotton, which is a new cotton variety with the same quality as the 
traditional cotton variety, allows farmers to control pest damage without pesticides. However, risk 
averse farmers who used BT cotton continued to use pesticides (Liu and Huang, 2013). This is 
because the farmers did not fully understand the function of the new technology. Furthermore, risk 
averse farmers were concerned about the possibility of pest damage. Following Tanaka et al. (2010), 
she also conducted an experiment to elicit the farmers’ risk preferences and revealed that farmers 
who feared yield loss or yield risk adopted BT cotton later since the farmers did not have sufficient 
knowledge of BT cotton while farmers who overweight the probability of pest damage adopted BT 
cotton earlier. Although agricultural production is affected by external factors (e.g. weather, pests) as 
well as the characteristics of the plot (e.g. soil quality, irrigation system), farmers cannot access 
exact information on how a new variety seed such as BT cotton will grow in their plot at the initial 
stage of introduction. The production of new variety seed entails not only exogenous risk and 
uncertainty but also risk and uncertainty in its function at the stage of introduction. Thus, BT cotton 
corresponds to Technology A in Fig. [1]. Liu’s (2013) results are concerned with the implications of 
risk preference on new technology when mixing two types of risk and uncertainty at the time of 
decision-making.    
 
Why do farmers’ risk preferences affect agricultural choices differently? One possible 
answer is the different type of risk and uncertainty that farmers face at the time of decision-making 
on technological adoption. A moisture meter does not entail risk and uncertainty in its function since 
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the moisture meter allows farmers to measure the moisture content of seeds accurately at any time. 
In fact, the surveyed farmers learned its function from the representative in each village at the 
inception meeting. A moisture meter is equivalent to Technology B in Fig. [1]. However, farmers 
still face risk and uncertainty in the accuracy of measuring the moisture content when they measure 
the moisture content of seeds by themselves. We found that risk averse farmers and farmers who 
overestimate a small probability tended to adopt the moisture meter since they were afraid of 
mismeasuring the moisture content of seeds. The different effect of risk preference on the 
agricultural technological adoption might be caused by the type of risk and uncertainty that farmers 
face when they make a decision on technological adoption. 
 
This interpretation is supported by our analysis of choice of rice variety. Risk and 
uncertainty in the function of MV are high at the time of introduction like BT cotton in China 
because external factors affect its function and farmers cannot access information on the function of 
MV in their plot. One of the differences between MV and BT cottons is its timing of introduction. 
Since farmers can learn about new technology from their own experience as well as that of other 
farmers, the degree of risk and uncertainty of MV became lower over time. In addition, since we 
focused on the wet season, natural disasters such as drought are unlikely to occur. Exogenous risk 
and uncertainty is expected to be low. In contrast to Liu (2013), we found that risk preferences did 
not determine the adoption of MV statistically. Since farmers know the function of MV and there are 
no exogenous risk and uncertainty, they make the optimal choice on variety based on other factors 
(e.g. characteristics of plot, function of technology). 
 
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In this paper, we investigated the effect of farmers’ risk preferences on the adoption 
decision across various types of technology. We conducted virtual questions following Tanaka et al. 
(2010) in order to elicit the farmers’ risk preferences, which cannot be observed directly. We 
considered the adoption of two types of agricultural technology: the use of a moisture meter and a 
modern rice variety (compared to the traditional variety). The moisture meter is a new technology 
introduced lately by IRRI and allows farmers to know the exact moisture content of rice at any time. 
The modern rice variety is a technology that has been prevailing widely for a long time. Risk and 
uncertainty in the function of MV existed at the time of its introduction and decreased over time. We 
found that risk averse farmers and farmers who overestimate small probabilities tended to use the 
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moisture meter to measure the moisture contents of seeds. In contrast, we found that farmers’ risk 
preferences were not important factors in the choice of rice variety. The effects of farmers’ risk 
attitude on technological adoption varied across different technologies and the timing of their 
introduction because types of risk and uncertainty differ at the time of decision-making on 
technological adoption. 
 
There are two policy implications. First, if the timing of technology adoption differs 
among people depending on their preferences, a quick assessment of a project using standard 
empirical program evaluation methodologies might miss the full impact of the project. For instance 
in our context, risk averse farmers initially start using a moisture meter and the appropriate moisture 
content of seeds improves the germination rate. However, over time, less risk averse people would 
start using a moisture meter. Thus, the timing of assessment of such a project apparently affects the 
estimated outcome, hence the evaluation of the project. Many studies that evaluate programs 
measure the relatively short-run effects of a project. But, our results suggest that people really need 
to know the relatively long-run effects of a project. Second, if policymakers plan to diffuse a 
technology that does not entail risk and uncertainty in its function (MV corresponds to this case in 
our context), it would be more productive to remove obstacles and bottlenecks that farmers routinely 
face such as improvement of the irrigation system.  
 
Footnotes 
1. The existence of a target income in the agricultural context has not been tested formally. However, 
many studies have shown evidence of a target income in various scenarios (Cameror et al., 1997; 
Farber, 2008; Fehr and Goette, 2007).  
2. The post-harvest technologies provided in the project included: Combine harvesting services, 
mechanical dryers, hermetic storage systems (especially, 50 kg Super bags (SB)), granary 
improvements, rice milling improvements, moisture meter, weighing scales, cleaner and 
thermometer. 
3. According to our interview with agricultural experts during our inception trip to the study area, 
Cambodians prefer to eat TV rice rather than MV rice because TV rice is tastier than MV rice.  
4. The averages of some variables differ significantly between treatment villages and control villages. 
However, this does not affect our analysis because we do not compare the treatment villages with the 
control villages in our analysis. 
5. As of 31 December 2012, US$1 was equivalent to 3,909.4 Cambodian Riel. 
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6. 𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟  𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒  𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟!" = 𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒  𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟!!!!!! /𝑁!,  
where 𝑖  is farmer i; v is village v; 𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒  𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟!  is a variable, which indicates 
whether farmer j adopted the moisture meter to measure the moisture content of seeds; 𝑁! is the 
number of samples in a village. 
7. Anecdotally, some agricultural unions are said to have contributed to the mass killings during the 
Pol Pot administration.  
8. Farmers usually sell their surplus of harvested rice to grain traders at their village. The entry of 
grain traders is limited in the local market since the entry cost of buyers is high (e.g. They must bear 
fixed costs such as those for storage facilities, vehicles for transportation as well as running 
transportation costs such as gas or access to credit to purchase agricultural goods.). Monopsony by 
grain traders occurs in the local market. Since the selling price is partly determined by the degree of 
the monopsony power of grain traders in their villages, village fixed effects partly allow us to control 
the monopsony power of buyers in the villages. 
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Sample usage rate
Whether farmers use moisture meter in wet season in 2012 150 43.3%
Purpose: to measure moisture content of 
 seeds 150 42.7%
 rice for sale 150 11.3%
 rice for own consumption 150 15.3%
 rice for storage 150 8.7%
Table 1. Usage of  moisture meter in wet season in 2012 
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Dry Season Early Wet season Wet season
Modern  Variety 100 73 43
Traditional Variety 3 6 353
Note: unit is plot.
Table 2. Number of usage of MV and TV in each season
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Variable Sample Mean Std.Dev
preference parameters of respondent
 σ (Value function curvature) 238 0.994 0.428
 λ (Loss aversion) 238 1.715 1.600
 α (Probability weighting) 238 0.652 0.214
characteristics of household
 age of head 238 48.534 12.303
 education of head (years) 238 5.025 3.121
 maximum education in household (years) 238 9.155 3.478
 sex of head (1=male, 0=female) 238 0.782 0.414
 number of family members 238 5.395 2.024
 whether head earns from non-agricultural work 238 0.160 0.367
 years of farming 238 27.651 12.819
 total non-agricultural income (riel) 238 4389215 5442374
agricutural activity
 whether farmer borrows money for rice farming
 in the past year
238 0.282 0.451
 total earning from rice farming in dry and early wet
 season (riel)
238 914628 2131897
 total amount of rice kept for selling in dry and early
 wet season  (kg)
238 114.286 691.031
 total amount of rice kept for self consumption in dry
 and early wet season (kg)
238 347.252 690.577
usage of moisture meter
 whether farmer uses moisture meter for  seed  in wet
 season in 2012 (Yes=1,No=0)
150 0.427 0.496
 other farmers'  usage rate of moisture meter for seed  in
 village in wet season in 2012 150 0.378 0.125
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of household
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Variable Sample Mean Std.Dev
area (ha) 396 0.796 0.899
type of soil
 clay 396 0.215 0.411
 sandy 396 0.025 0.157
 other 396 0.025 0.157
 loam 396 0.778 0.416
elevation
 high 396 0.066 0.248
 middle 396 0.828 0.378
 low 396 0.106 0.308
type of irrigation system
 deep wall pump 396 0.028 0.165
 shallow tube well 396 0.020 0.141
 pumped from river/canal/dam 396 0.273 0.446
 none/rainfall 396 0.707 0.456
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of plot
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Lottery A Lottery B
Series 1 
1 70% winning 40,000 riel and 30% winning 10,000 riel 1 10% winning 68,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
2 70% winning 40,000 riel and 30% winning 10,000 riel 2 10% winning 75,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
3 70% winning 40,000 riel and 30% winning 10,000 riel 3 10% winning 83,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
4 70% winning 40,000 riel and 30% winning 10,000 riel 4 10% winning 93,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
5 70% winning 40,000 riel and 30% winning 10,000 riel 5 10% winning 106,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
6 70% winning 40,000 riel and 30% winning 10,000 riel 6 10% winning 125,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
7 70% winning 40,000 riel and 30% winning 10,000 riel 7 10% winning 150,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
8 70% winning 40,000 riel and 30% winning 10,000 riel 8 10% winning 185,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
9 70% winning 40,000 riel and 30% winning 10,000 riel 9 10% winning 220,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
10 70% winning 40,000 riel and 30% winning 10,000 riel 10 10% winning 300,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
11 70% winning 40,000 riel and 30% winning 10,000 riel 11 10% winning 400,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
12 70% winning 40,000 riel and 30% winning 10,000 riel 12 10% winning 600,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
13 70% winning 40,000 riel and 30% winning 10,000 riel 13 10% winning 1,000,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
14 70% winning 40,000 riel and 30% winning 10,000 riel 14 10% winning 1,700,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
Series 2
1 90% winning 40,000 riel and 10% winning 30,000 riel 1 70% winning 54,000 riel and 30% winning 5,000 riel
2 90% winning 40,000 riel and 10% winning 30,000 riel 2 70% winning 56,000 riel and 30% winning 5,000 riel
3 90% winning 40,000 riel and 10% winning 30,000 riel 3 70% winning 58,000 riel and 30% winning 5,000 riel
4 90% winning 40,000 riel and 10% winning 30,000 riel 4 70% winning 60,000 riel and 30% winning 5,000 riel
5 90% winning 40,000 riel and 10% winning 30,000 riel 5 10% winning 62,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
6 90% winning 40,000 riel and 10% winning 30,000 riel 6 10% winning 65,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
7 90% winning 40,000 riel and 10% winning 30,000 riel 7 10% winning 68,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
8 90% winning 40,000 riel and 10% winning 30,000 riel 8 10% winning 72,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
9 90% winning 40,000 riel and 10% winning 30,000 riel 9 10% winning 77,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
10 90% winning 40,000 riel and 10% winning 30,000 riel 10 10% winning 83,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
11 90% winning 40,000 riel and 10% winning 30,000 riel 11 10% winning 90,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
12 90% winning 40,000 riel and 10% winning 30,000 riel 12 10% winning 100,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
13 90% winning 40,000 riel and 10% winning 30,000 riel 13 10% winning 110,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
14 90% winning 40,000 riel and 10% winning 30,000 riel 14 10% winning 130,000 riel and 90% winning 5,000 riel
Series 3
1 50% winning 25,000 riel and 50% losing 4,000 riel 1 50% winning 30,000 riel and 50% losing 20,000 riel
2 50% winning 4,000 riel and 50% losing 4,000 riel 2 50% winning 30,000 riel and 50% losing 20,000 riel
3 50% winning 1,000 riel and 50% losing 4,000 riel 3 50% winning 30,000 riel and 50% losing 20,000 riel
4 50% winning 1,000 riel and 50% losing 4,000 riel 4 50% winning 30,000 riel and 50% losing 16,000 riel
5 50% winning 1,000 riel and 50% losing 8,000 riel 5 50% winning 30,000 riel and 50% losing 16,000 riel
6 50% winning 1,000 riel and 50% losing 8,000 riel 6 50% winning 30,000 riel and 50% losing 14,000 riel
7 50% winning 1,000 riel and 50% losing 8,000 riel 7 50% winning 30,000 riel and 50% losing 11,000 riel
Table 5. Payoff of lottery
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dependent variable: whether farmer uses moisture meter for measuring moisture contents of seed
Std. Err Std. Err
σ (Value function curvature) -0.240 ** 0.091 -0.234 ** 0.100
λ (Loss aversion) -0.019 0.035 -0.026 0.036
α (Probability weighting) -0.414 ** 0.183 -0.373 * 0.205
age of head -0.004 0.008
education of head (years) 0.011 *** 0.013
maximum education in household (years) -0.022 0.022
sex of head (1=male, 0=female) 0.038 0.099
number of family members 0.012 0.022
years of farming 0.005 0.008
total non-agricultural income (log) -0.219 * 0.115
total amount of saving for seeds (log) -0.004 0.028
moisture meter usage rate of other farmers
for seed  in village
0.094 0.430
Sample size
Adjusted R squared
150 146
0.039 0.013
Note: 1. Standard error in parenthesis is clustered at village level. 2. All regressions include province
fixed effects. 3. The unit of observations for the regression is the original farmer.
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.
Coef. Coef.
Table 6.  OLS regression of moisture meter use for seed 
Column (1) Column (2)independent variables
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dependent variable: whether farmer adopts a modern variety in wet season in  2012 
Std. Err Std. Err Std. Err
σ (Value function curvature) -0.015 0.030 -0.034 0.043 -0.017 0.044
λ (Loss aversion) -0.004 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.010
α (Probability weighting) -0.041 0.082 -0.019 0.088 -0.016 0.078
age of head 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.003
education of head (year) 0.010 0.006 0.010 * 0.006 0.008 0.005
maximum education in household (year) -0.005 0.004 -0.011 * 0.006 -0.013 * 0.007
sex of head (1=male, 0=female) 0.070 *** 0.024 0.066 * 0.034 0.054 0.035
number of family members 0.013 0.016 0.019 0.016 0.020 0.017
whether head earns from non-agricultural work 0.044 0.048 0.046 0.053 0.025 0.062
years of farming 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.003
total non-agricultural income (log) -0.019 0.013 -0.020 * 0.011 -0.001 0.007
whether farmer borrows money for crop in the past year 0.063 0.052 0.053 0.050 0.050 0.056
total earning from rice farming
in dry and early wet season (log)
-0.010 *** 0.003 -0.008 ** 0.003 -0.007 ** 0.004
total amount of rice kept for selling in dry and early wet
season  (log)
-0.012 0.009 -0.014 0.010 -0.006 0.010
total amount of rice kept for self consumption in dry and
early wet season (log)
0.015 ** 0.007 0.012 * 0.006 0.008 * 0.007
Characteristics of plot
 area (ha) 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.017
 type of soil
  clay -0.023 0.038 -0.052 0.032
  sandy 0.080 0.126 0.056 0.123
  other -0.296 0.201 -0.125 0.130
elevation
  high 0.126 0.085 0.135 0.099
  middle 0.027 0.028 0.026 0.033
type of irrigation system
  deep wall pump -0.088 0.054 -0.060 0.043
  shallow tube well 0.070 0.080 0.044 0.068
  pumped from river/canal/dam 0.149 ** 0.062 0.138 ** 0.064
Sample size
Adjusted R squared
Table 7.  Result for modern variety
Column(3)
Coef.
351
0.204
Coef. Coef.
independent variables Column(1) Column(2)
Note: 1. Standard error in parenthesis is clustered at village level. 2. All regressions include village fixed effects.  3. The unit of
observations for the regression is the plot. 4. Analysis is weighted by household level.
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.
396
0.259 0.311
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Figure 1.  
(a) Technology A 
 
(b) Technology B 
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Figure 2. Photo of moisture meter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
